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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
Supreme Court No. 35772 -2008

VS.
LARRY GRANT DANA, JR.,
Defendant;
and
TWO JINN, INC., Real Party in Interest,
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Payette County, Idaho.
HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER, Presiding Judge
SusanM. Campbell
Associate General Counsel
80 North Cole Road
Boise, ID 83704
Telephone: 208-287-221 1
Facsimile: 208-287-3302
scampbell@twojinn.com
Attorney for Appellant

Office of the Attorney General
Karin Magnelli, Deputy
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: 208-334-2400
Facsimile: 208-854-8073
karin.magnelli@ag.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Respondent
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11.
A.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

-1.C. 5 19-2927 Requires the 1ssuance.of.anActi~x.Bench_Warran

When a defendant fails to appear before the court as ordered and a bail bond is forfeited
due to a defendant's failure to appear, the bail provisions are in place to facilitate the return of a
defendant to the court - before he really disappears. The purpose of the bail bond agreement is
to effectuate the defendant's presence in court to answer to the charges brought by the state - it is
not meant to collect revenue or to punish sureties. See State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144
Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792 (Ct. Appeals 2007).
The State asserts the court "substantially complied" with I.C.

3 19-2927. In support of

this position, the State relies upon the Vargas case and asserts that the court substantially
complied with the statutory requirements because a warrant was issued. The Vargas case
involved a clerical error with the date on the notice of forfeiture. See State v. Vargas, 141 Idaho
485,487, 111 P.3d 621, 623 (Ct. App. 2005). Substantial compliance with the statute occurred
in Vargas because the bonding company had actual notice of the court's forfeiture of the bond
despite the clerical error.
The State further argues that while I.C. § 19-2927 only requires the issuance of the bench
warrant, this provision does not require the bench warrant be executed. The purpose of the
issuance of a warrant is not met if it is not executed. The State's argument parsing the language
of the statute is without merit.

If the bench warrant is not active, it hampers a bonding

company's abilities to arrest an absconding defendant and defeats the goal of returning a
defendant to court to answer to his charges. Common sense dictates that any delay in having an
active bench warrant allows the absconder additional time to hide. Thus, inherent in the

mandatory issuance of a bench warrant when a bond is forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-2927 is
at the bench warrant be activ
A stay of the mandatory bench warrant does not meet the statutory substantial
compliance standard. LC.

8 19-2927 requires the issuance of an active bench warrant when it

uses the term "must immediately" order the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of the
defendant.
B. The District Court Does Not Have the Inherent Authority to Stay the Execution of a
Bench Warrant When a Bond Is Forfeited Pursuant to I.C. 3 19-2927.
The State appears to be arguing that a stay of the issuance of the warrant was'for judicial
efficiency because the court could then control its docket and still have a hearing on February 12,
2009. The court had the discretion to not forfeit the bond until February 12, 2009. See

Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 117-118, 952 P.2d 1249, 1253-1254 (Ct.App.1998).
The Court in Abracadabra Bail Bonds concluded that the magistrate's decision declining to
forfeit the defendant's bail was not only within its discretion but was consistent with the policy
disfavoring forfeitures. The court did not have the discretion to stay the issuance of a mandatory
bench warrant when it ordered the bail forfeited pursuant to LC. § 19-2927.
C. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Setting Aside the Forfeiture and
Exonerating the Bond Pursuant to 1.C.R 46(e)4 When the Statutory Requirements
of I.C. 9 19-2927 Were Not Met.
The State argues that Two Jinn failed to establish it was prejudiced by the district court's
actions when the court stayed the issuance of an active bench warrant. The fact that the
Defendant was not located is the prejudice incurred by Two Jinii. It will never be k n o m
whether Dana would have been arrested on the bench warrant in that initial period of time
because the clock cannot be rewound to see what would have happened during that time with an
active bench warrant.

If the court forfeited the bond on February 12, 2008, then the 180 day time frame would
have been from that date. When the bond was forfeited on January 23,2008, the 180 day clock
in which to locate the Defendant and arrest him for surrender began to run, but without the active
bench warrant, which defeated the purpose of getting the Defendant before the court. As a
result, the Court abused its discretion in not setting aside the forfeiture and exonerating this bond
pursuant to 1.C.R 46(e)4 when the statutory requirements of I.C. 8 19-2927 were not met.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Two J i m respectfully asks that the order denying Two Jim's Motion be
vacated and that an order exonerating the bond be entered.
DATED THIS 29thday of July, 2009.
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